A host of important political issues loom in Pakistan in a seemingly decisive phase, in the ensuing weeks of June and July 2023. These include the timing of elections, both of the national and provincial assemblies, formation of caretaker administrations and their duration, the imminent arrest/disqualification of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, ways of circumventing judicial relief to him, the promotion of a new ‘King’s Party’ to counter or split the latter’s persisting popular support, especially in Punjab and the type of a credible electoral mandate which can be engineered this time, without eroding the Army’s overall control.
At the recently concluded 81st Formation Commanders conference (June 5-7, 2023), the first to be held under new Army Chief, Gen Asim Munir, a riot act was clearly read out about the legal consequences which would befall the perpetrators, planners and instigators of the May 9 mayhem, wrought on military installations and properties by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Imran’s besotted rabble-rousers.
The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) emphasised that the noose would “tighten” around these “planners and masterminds, who mounted the hate-ripened and politically driven rebellion against the state and state institutions.” The forum resolved that endeavours by any quarter to “create obstructions and stymie the conclusive defeat of ill-design of inimical forces will be dealt with iron hands.”
Even as Imran raised a hue and cry with sympathetic interviewers from the international media, the ISPR made no bones about “hostile forces and their abettors” trying hard to create societal division and confusion through fake news and propaganda, unfounded and baseless allegations on law enforcement agencies and security forces for alleged custodial torture, human rights abuse and stifling of political activities. These were meant to mislead the people and malign the Armed Forces in order to achieve trivial vested political interests, the ISPR said. Efforts to create distortions and attempts to take refuge behind “imaginary and mirage human rights violations to create a smoke screen for hiding the ugly faces of all involved” would not be allowed. Its press release added, “All such designs will be defeated with the full support of the nation.”
The military leadership has let it known that there is “abundantly collected irrefutable evidence” about “desecrators of Shuhada Monuments, Jinnah House and attackers of military installations” who would be “brought to justice under the Pakistan Army Act and Official Secret Act, which are the derivatives of the Constitution of Pakistan.” Though the military leadership gave a firm message of its intentions, it is not clear yet if civilians would be tried in military courts. Not all PDM constituents seem on board in this regard. In an attempt to defuse adverse criticism, especially from international media, the military let it emerge informally that women supporters of Imran Khan, now in detention, may not be tried in military courts.
The Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) civilian regime tabled another lacklustre budget, depending heavily on market borrowings and providing the usual 11-15 percent increase for the Defence Services. Salaries of civilian employees were raised across the board, with a populist eye on ensuing elections. Now it has to decide when to wind up its tenure. If it stays full term till August 13, 2023, elections to the National Assembly (NA) would require to be held within 60 days. If it dissolves a few days earlier, it could earn a 90-day reprieve. This would presage an election date between mid-October to mid-November, 2023.
Caretaker administrations would have to be set up in consultation with the Opposition. None exists at the Centre. Ex-PTI legislator in the NA, Raza Riaz, is a lightweight. The Opposition is notional and mixed in Sindh and Balochistan. Caretaker regimes already exist in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). While views of Nawaz Sharif and Asif Zardari may be taken on board, the Army’s voice is likely to prove decisive in selecting personnel, whether politicians, legal luminaries or technocrats, for these setups.
After Shah Mehmood Qureshi’s release from detention on June 6, his much-touted meeting with Imran Khan did not go too well. Imran was apparently not willing to take his counsel or fully trust his leadership of a truncated PTI. Imran continues to believe, not without some justification, that his own popularity and vote bank remain intact even if the party has to go to the polls without him. His somewhat desperate appeals to the military establishment to talk to him remain unheeded.
Meanwhile, a new ‘King’s Party’, the Istehkam-e-Pakistan Party (IPP) was launched with much fanfare on June 8 by Jahangir Tareen, a former close aide of Imran Khan, herding together recently ‘jumped’ heavyweights from PTI like Fawad Chaudhry, Imran Ismail, Awn Chaudhry, Ali Haider Zaidi and erstwhile PTI moneybags from Punjab like Aleem Khan. The party is yet to register itself with the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) or seek a symbol different from the PTI’s ‘cricket bat’ mascot. As no overt evidence emerged of the Army’s blessings, the initial euphoria of its formation seems to have quickly ebbed. Some leaders like Fawad Chaudhry, who quit PTI in a hurry to avoid prolonged incarceration under the Army’s watch, are now rumoured to be having second thoughts about returning to the PTI fold.
Tareen himself remains disqualified for life, as does PDM’s exiled leader, Nawaz Sharif, whose return from London for participating in the ensuing election campaign still remains uncertain. There is a rumour that Jahangir Tareen may meet him in London soon, possibly to decide on the strategy to take advantage of recent legislation, permitting an appeal against the life disqualification order.
After the audio leaks of the Supreme Court Chief Justice (CJ), Umar Ata Bandial’s mother-in-law expressing sympathy for Imran Khan’s agenda became public, the higher judiciary has become more cautious in openly censoring the PDM regime. Bandial has decided to hear the corruption allegations against Justice Mazhar Ali Naqvi in the Supreme Judicial Council and also take up filling of vacancies in the Supreme Court. However, he is still relying on his favoured three-judge bench, comprising Justices Izhar ul Ahsan, Muneeb Akhtar and himself, to rule on the ECP’s review petition on the Punjab and KP polls order (April 4) and various other controversial cases. He has stayed the effect of new legislations passed by the National Assembly, restricting the CJ’s discretion to set up benches or take up issues under suo moto jurisdiction (Art 184{3}). He has suspended the functioning of the Judiciary Enquiry Commission under Justice Qazi Faiz Isa, set up by the PDM government, to enquire into the audio leaks issue. The Lahore High Court, under Justice Bhatti, continues to be generous in granting temporary but extendable pre-arrest bail to Imran and his wife in the myriad criminal cases filed against them.
This political instability in Pakistan may continue for a while as no clear policies to bail the country out of its severe economic crisis seem visible at present.
The writer is a former special secretary, Cabinet Secretariat. Views expressed are personal.
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